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We examine the influence of social distance on levels of trust and reciprocity in China. Social 
distance, reflected in the indigenous concept of guanxi, is of central importance to Chinese 
culture. In Study 1, some participants participated in two financially salient trust games to 
measure behavior, one with an anonymous classmate and the other with an anonymous, 
demographically identical nonclassmate. Other participants, drawn from the same population, 
completed hypothetical surveys to gauge both hypothetical behavior and expectations of others. 
Social distance effects on actual and hypothetical behavior were statistically consistent. The 
results together corroborated the hypothesized negative relationship between trust and social 
distance. However, reciprocity was not responsive to social distance. Study 2 found that affect-
based trust, but not cognition-based trust, played a mediating role in the relationship between 
social distance and interpersonal trust in a hypothetical scenario. We conclude that close guanxi 
ties in China engender affect-based trust, which is extended to shouren classmates. This is true 
despite the fact that no more cognition-based trust is placed nor reciprocity received or expected 
from classmates compared to demographically identical shengren nonclassmates. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Trust and reciprocity are the glue of social exchange (Granovetter, 1985; Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977; 
Yamagishi, 1998). As many social and economic transactions take place sequentially, one party 
must transfer valuable resources to another before obtaining anything in return and the other 
party must honor an obligation that might be in its short-term interest to ignore. In theory, such 
obligations can be enforced by formal contracts and sanctioning systems. In practice, however, 
imperfect monitoring, information asymmetries, moral hazard, and transaction costs often make 
the use of binding contracts infeasible or prohibitively costly. As a result, trust and reciprocity are 
essential in human affairs: without trust and reciprocity, many beneficial social exchanges would 
not begin and without reciprocity they would not end, to the detriment of the involved parties in 
particular and society in general. 
This article examines the role of social distance (Akerlof, 1997), the relational closeness of the 
interacting parties, in determining trust and reciprocity. We examine this in the context of China 
for several reasons. First, cross-cultural research holds China to be the paragon of highly 
collectivist societies (e.g., Hofstede, 1991), in which boundaries of trust are limited to narrow 
ingroups (Bond, 1991; Triandis, 1995). Though trust everywhere involves cognitive and affective 
bases, comparative studies find that in China the relationally relevant affective bases are more 
salient (Wasti, Tan, & Erdil, 2011) and that the two types of trust are more intertwined (Chua, 
Morris, & Ingram, 2009). Moreover, it has been suggested that the obligations of reciprocity in 
collectivist societies permeate many facets of life and are difficult to break (Wasti, Tan, & Erdil, 
2011). In sum, the comparatively greater salience of relational concerns in China makes it a good 
setting in which to identify influences of relational closeness on trust and reciprocity.  
Second, the relevance of social distance is recognized in indigenous Chinese folk psychology.  
The ubiquitous term guanxi literally means relationships, and refers to particularistic ties rooted 
in common background and experience that facilitate exchange (Tsui & Farh, 1997). 
Management researchers have explored different ways to operationalize the concept of guanxi 
and examine its impact on various interpersonal interactions in China (e.g., Chai & Rhee, 2010;   3 
 
Farh, Tsui, Xin, & Cheng, 1998; Luo, 2000; Tsui & Farh, 1997; Xin & Pearce, 1996; Yang, 
1994). We join this effort by offering another approach, examining how trust and reciprocity in 
economic games varies as a function of guanxi-relevant relationship categories.   
Another goal of this research is to investigate the convergent validity of two common ways of 
measuring trust and reciprocity – behavioral games with real economic incentives versus 
hypothetical scenarios about such games.  The use of behavioral measures with salient financial 
incentives in this area of research has been strongly endorsed by some behavioral psychologists 
(e.g., Hogarth & Reder, 1987), behavioral/experimental economists (Camerer, 2003; Rabin, 
2002; Smith, 1976), and social-exchange sociologists (Yamagishi, 1998). However, hypothetical 
measures have also been widely used by some economists (e.g., Buchan & Croson, 2004) and 
many managerial and social psychologists (e.g., Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Robinson, 
1996; Rotter, 1967). It is unclear at present whether these two types of measures tap the same 
underlying psychological processes. Earlier research shows that being psychologically removed 
from a situation can make it difficult for people to imagine how their behavior might be 
influenced by emotional or visceral forces that are felt in the actual situation (Loewenstein, 1996; 
Van Boven, Dunning, & Loewenstein, 2000). In such circumstances, it may be difficult for 
people to predict correctly how they would act. Two recent studies discussed below, one a 
laboratory experiment with financial incentives (Buchan, Johnson, & Croson, 2006) and the other 
hypothetical (Buchan & Croson, 2004), report contradictory results on the effect of social 
distance on trust and reciprocity in China. However, these studies differ from each other along 
other dimensions as well. Thus, it is not clear whether their different conclusions arise from a 
difference between behavioral and hypothetical measures or some other difference in procedures. 
To investigate this, the present research studies the effect of social distance under both conditions 
– behavioral games with real incentives versus hypothetical scenarios about such games –
randomly assigning participants to these conditions so as to examine any effects of this factor. 
 
   4 
 
TRUST, RECIPROCITY, AND GUANXI 
We build on the widely used definition of trust by Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer (1998: 
395): ‘a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive 
expectations of the intentions or behavior of another’. In our study, this definition is broadened to 
include both the expression of a hypothetical intention to accept such vulnerability and explicit 
behavior resulting from such an intention. Correspondingly, we adopt a definition of reciprocity 
as the act of ‘voluntarily repaying a trusting move at a later point in time, although defaulting on 
such repayment is in the short-term self-interest of the reciprocator’ (Gunnthorsdottir, McCabe, 
& Smith, 2002: 50). In trust and reciprocity exchanges, one party’s action prompts another’s 
response, the anticipation of which in turn affects the first party’s action. Hence, a game-theoretic 
approach, analyzing strategic decision situations with an explicit emphasis on exchange, conflict, 
and interdependence, is appropriate for studying such a phenomenon (Murnighan, 1994). To this 
end, we use a variant of the widely employed ‘trust’ game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995; see 
Camerer, 2003; Wilson & Eckel, forthcoming; Garbarino & Slonim, 2009, for extensive reviews 
of the large empirical literature using this game) to model and measure trust and reciprocity. 
Participants are randomly assigned to be either trustors or trustees and given identical monetary 
endowments at the beginning of the game. Each trustor then decides how much of his/her 
endowment to send to an anonymous counterpart (trustee), with whom s/he is paired at random. 
Any amount from zero to the entire endowment may be sent. All participants are informed that 
the experimenter will triple the amount sent before it is passed on to the trustee. This tripling 
represents the benefits of trust to those participating in a trust/reciprocity exchange. After 
receiving the money, each trustee then decides how to split his/her total wealth, i.e., the sum of 
his/her initial endowment plus the tripled amount received, between him/herself and the trustor as   5 
 
an act of reciprocity. Each trustee is permitted to divide his/her post-transfer level of wealth in 
any manner s/he desires between him/herself and the trustor with whom s/he was randomly 
matched. 
Non-cooperative game theory predicts that trustees, if self-interested, rational, and motivated to 
maximize their wealth, would send no money back to trustors. Since there is no way of 
penalizing such self-interested behavior, rational trustors should then accurately expect trustees to 
send nothing back. Therefore, trustors have no motivation to send anything to trustees in the first 
place. Thus the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium predicts neither trust nor reciprocity behavior 
in such a setting. In stark contrast, both trust and reciprocity are observed in behavioral studies 
where people play these games; the vast majority of trustors send nontrivial amounts to trustees, 
who in turn send nontrivial amounts back. Average amounts sent have been documented to range 
from 40 to 60 percent of trustor endowments, while amounts returned average 110 percent of the 
amount originally sent (Camerer 2003). Such patterns have been attributed to aspects of human 
psychology beyond narrow self-interest such as moral sentiments and the motivation to uphold 
social norms. However, investigations of factors moderating trust and reciprocity are needed to 
test such explanations more incisively. 
Guanxi is an idea familiar to virtually every Chinese person. It expresses the central importance 
of social relationships within Chinese society. Of course, relationships are important in economic 
interactions in both Western and Chinese societies (e.g., Burt, 1992; Luo, 2000; Tsui & Farh 
1997; Xin & Pearce 1996). Yet many scholars contend that relationships are more important to 
trust in China, in part because there may be less generalized trust – trust extended to all other 
people (e.g., Bian, 1997; Chen & Chen, 2004; Su & Littlefield, 2001). For Chinese people it is 
argued that the level of trust depends on the category of relationship one has with another person   6 
 
(e.g., Butterfield, 1982, Chen & Chen, 2004). Put differently, trust toward members of one’s 
ingroup and distrust toward others is one of the strongest characteristics of interpersonal relations 
in China (Yang, 1994). Thus, trust is considered very important in China and yet at the same time 
it is difficult to build trust beyond fairly restrictive circles (e.g. Fukuyama, 1995). 
How do people build guanxi? Chiao (1982) and King (1991) suggest that Chinese guanxi is 
often based on shared social experiences and associations, such as with relatives or classmates. 
According to Yang (1994), guanxi also implies ‘social connections’ built implicitly, without the 
need for explicit discussion or arrangements, upon mutual interest and benefits. Once two people 
have established a sufficient level of guanxi, each can request a favor from the other knowing that 
the opportunity to reciprocate will arise at an appropriate time in the future. Tsui and Farh (1997) 
further note that such interpersonal favors and acts of generosity are rendered with the 
anticipation that they will be reciprocated. Moreover, Xin and Pearce (1996) found executives 
use guanxi connections to reduce threats to their business such as extortion or appropriation. 
Other recent empirical works also show that guanxi is critical for achieving entrepreneurial 
success in China (e.g. Guo & Giacobbe-Miller, 2010; Li, Yao, Sue-Chan, & Xi, 2011). Theorists 
propose that guanxi functions as a substitute for legal protections, providing ‘contextual 
confidence’ for building trust (Child & Mollering, 2003). 
Given the time-scale over which guanxi operates, it is important to test its effects as a function 
of real relationships rather than relationships contrived in the laboratory. Our research was 
conducted with undergraduate business students at the Dongbei University of Finance and 
Economics (DUFE) and the Shanghai University of Finance and Economics (SHUFE). At DUFE 
and SHUFE, as at many other Chinese universities, four classmates generally share a dorm room 
during the four years spent at a university. Females from the same class are all in adjacent rooms,   7 
 
as are males. They take almost all of their classes together. Jacobs (1979) found that being 
classmates is a base for guanxi. Su and Littlefield (2001) place classmates at the more specific 
level of shouren guanxi, a close category that also includes relatives other than immediate family, 
friends, teachers, neighbours, and coworkers. Although two students from the same university 
who are from different classes and do not know each other might share some guanxi by virtue of 
attending the same university, the level of such guanxi would be considerably lower than 
between two classmates (Jacobs, 1979). In particular, their relationship would be comparable to 
employees in the same large company, whom Su and Littlefield (2001) place in the more distant 
category of shengren guanxi.  
 
Hypotheses 
Since classmates are shouren and university-mates merely shengren, classmates should garner 
more trust. Moreover, Farh, Tsui, Xin, and Cheng (1998) show that among 32 business 
executives in China, being former classmates was one of three guanxi variables that were 
significantly related to the expression of more interpersonal trust. Thus, we expect more trust 
among classmates than among nonclassmates. Since classmates and nonclassmates are in the 
same demographic category, relational demography theory provides no reason to trust one more 
than the other. Moreover, although personal feelings between two specific individuals who know 
each other can certainly have a strong impact on guanxi as well as on trust and reciprocity 
behavior, no such feelings can play a role in our anonymous study either. Indeed there is no 
reason to expect any difference in character or personality between a classmate and a 
nonclassmate. Thus, our first hypothesis focuses solely on the role played by the guanxi category 
in affecting the level of trust.    8 
 
 
Hypothesis 1a:  Trustors will exhibit a higher level of trust toward classmates 
than toward nonclassmates. 
 
Hypothesis 1b:  Trustees will expect a higher level of trust from classmates than 
from nonclassmates. 
    
  The arguments underlying our next two hypotheses arise out of similar considerations to those 
underlying the first. Since classmates are shouren, while nonclassmates are shengren, one might 
expect a more generous reciprocity response from a classmate than from a nonclassmate. 
Moreover, if reciprocity responses were more generous from classmates than from nonclassmates, 
it would provide a rationale for placing more trust in classmates as is predicted by Hypothesis 1. 
Hence the second hypothesis proposes an impact of social distance on reciprocity, measured by 
money returned over money sent (e.g., Berg et al., 1995, Camerer, 2003; Song, 2008, 2009).  
 
Hypothesis 2a:  Reciprocity (the ratio of money returned to that sent) will be 
higher from classmates than from nonclassmates. 
 
Hypothesis 2b:  Trustors will expect higher reciprocity from classmates than from 
nonclassmates. 
 
Contrasting with the second hypothesis, a different strand of theory leads to an alternative 
conjecture. The reciprocity decision is quite different from the initial decision to trust. Trusting   9 
 
involves exposure to an uncertain outcome; a trustor must always be aware of the possibility of 
betrayal once trust is extended. A trustee faces no such uncertainty and no such financial risk. 
S/he has received a sum of money from an anonymous trustor and must simply decide how much 
money to return to the trustor as a reciprocating gesture. Since there is no uncertainty about the 
outcome, there is little reason to concern oneself about the likely reaction of the anonymous 
trustor. Thus, the reciprocity decision might be less influenced by social distance or guanxi. This 
logic is similar to Tsui and Farh’s (1997: 62) proposal that guanxi ‘may play a more significant 
role in Chinese organizational behavior when task uncertainty is high than when it is low’. 
Moreover, Su and Littlefield (2001: 203) argue that if a shengren takes ‘the lead to make the 
commitment to a common interest’, this behavior will be appreciated and ‘cannot be explicitly 
refused’ according to the principle of renqing, which involves the exchange of favors and 
generosity. Hwang (1987) emphasizes that the principle of renqing places an obligation on the 
recipient of a gift to reciprocate to the donor. Thus, whether a gift is received from a classmate 
shouren or from a nonclassmate shengren, the same reciprocation would be expected. Hence the 
contrasting hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 3a:  Reciprocity will not differ between classmates and nonclassmates. 
Hypothesis 3b:  Trustors’ expectations of reciprocity will not differ between 
classmates and nonclassmates. 
 
We have considered trust in terms of sending money in trust games, another approach 
considers trust as social perceptions/intentions toward another. Organizational researchers have 
distinguished between two types of trust in relationships: cognition- and affect-based trust (e.g.,   10 
 
Lewicki & Bunker, 1995; McAllister, 1995; Ng & Chua, 2006). Cognition-based trust involves 
perceptions that another person has the competency and integrity to be trustworthy, while affect-
based trust is based on the emotional bond and concerns one feels toward the other person – 
simply put, trust from the head versus trust from the heart (Chua, Morris, & Ingram, 2009). 
Empirical research has provided evidence of discriminant validity for these two types of trust (Ng 
& Chua, 2006) and has shown that they can lead to different behaviors and reactions (Levin & 
Cross, 2004; Ng & Chua, 2006). Chua et al. (2009) argued that in China affective bonds among 
business partners are especially important relative to comparable relationships in the United 
States and further demonstrated that cognition-based trust is more intertwined with affect-based 
trust among Chinese than among American managers. This particular conceptualization of trust is 
closely related to the discussion of guanxi by Chen and Chen (2004), who argue that guanxi 
quality is predicted by both trust (xin) and feeling (qing), where trust is primarily cognition-based 
and feeling affect-based. Thus, for Chinese people guanxi quality derives from a combination of 
both cognition-based and affect-based factors, which are closely related to the two types of trust 
discussed above. The important role of affect in Chinese organizations is evident in many 
organizational practices. For example, many companies in China hold regular festival parties and 
organize vacation trips for employees to socialize with each other. Co-workers and colleagues 
often know each other’s family and friends well, cultivate friendships, and socialize with each 
other after work. Thus, we might expect that trusting behavior related to guanxi in China will 
have an affective basis.  
Our studies test this in a circumstance where this affective basis cannot be confounded with a 
cognitive basis as it might in many real world contexts.  We compare trust between classmate 
shouren and nonclassmate shengren at the same university. Since the classmates and   11 
 
nonclassmates in our study are demographically alike (i.e., same university, similar education, 
similar age), there would be little variance in factors relevant to cognition-based trust. Given the 
anonymous nature of the interaction, participants cannot apply knowledge of the individual 
personality and behavioural history of their counterpart.  Also, the anonymous nature of the game 
eliminates the factor of anticipated social sanctioning, isolating the role of positive affective 
feelings that come with a close shengren relationship. Thus, we propose the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 4a:  Affect-based trust will be greater for classmates than for 
nonclassmates, but there will be no such difference in cognition-based 
trust. 
 
Hypothesis 4b:  Affect-based trust will mediate the effect of 




Using the experimental framework of the trust game, this study examines the effects of three 
manipulated factors. The first is a between-participants factor: the random assignment of 
participants to the behavioral games with salient financial incentives or hypothetical survey 
scenarios about games, permitting the gathering of these two types of data separately with no 
cross-contamination, and allowing comparisons across these response formats in participants’ 
decisions and their expectations about counterparts. (Note that comparing such response formats 
in a within-participants design would render any such comparison suspect since most people 
would likely report hypothetical beliefs consistent with their actual behavior.)  
   The second and most important factor is a within-person manipulation of social distance,   12 
 
involving interaction with a classmate in one’s own curricular track versus a nonclassmate who 
attends the same university but takes different classes on different subjects. This within-person 
factor is used to control for individual differences in general trust/reciprocity preferences when 
examining the impact of social distance on trust and reciprocity. The third manipulation is a 
between-person factor: the order of the within-person social-distance manipulation. The order is 
reversed and this factor is counterbalanced to isolate the social-distance effect from potential 
order effects.  
The 234 participants majored primarily in Business English or Public Administration at DUFE 
and all had taken similar courses related to economics, so their levels of exposure to game theory 
were equivalent. The behavioral session consisted of 116 (79 women and 37 men) participants 
with an average age of 20.79 (SD=0.95). The hypothetical session consisted of 118 participants 
(80 women and 38 men) with an average age of 20.41(SD=0.93). Everyone directly involved in 
conducting the experiment was Chinese to avoid any effect of foreign involvement on behavior. 
 
Behavioral session procedure. Participants from two different university classes arrived at the 
experiment site. Each participant was asked to pick an identification card out of a box, which 
determined his/her participant code and assignment to either the ‘Party A’ (‘Jiafang’ in Chinese) 
or ‘Party B’ (‘Yifang’ in Chinese) role, corresponding to trustor and trustee, respectively. In order 
to avoid possible framing effects, the word ‘trust’ was not mentioned at all during the experiment. 
Participants were then escorted to the assigned ‘Party A’ or ‘Party B’ room for their class, where 
they stayed for the remainder of the session. Thus, participants sat in one of four rooms assigned 
on the basis of both class and role in the experiment and did not meet each other during the 
experiment. All participants received the same general instructions about the trust game. They 
were informed that the experiment involved the game described above in which they would either 
play the ‘Party A’ or ‘Party B’ role. The game was illustrated with several numerical examples in 
the instructions. The instructions were read aloud to the participants and they were then given 
time to ask questions. Participants were also told that they would remain anonymous during the   13 
 
experiment (they were only identified by their unique participant codes), and that they would get 
paid in cash at the end of the game based on the decisions they made and those made by another 
participant with whom they would be randomly paired during the game. Participants were asked 
to complete a quiz containing a numerical example to ensure that they completely understood the 
game. 
The experiment began at that point. Each trustor and trustee received a Ұ20.00 RMB 
endowment at the beginning of each of the two experimental rounds. A decision record form was 
employed for trustors and trustees to communicate their decisions anonymously to each other. 
The decision record forms were delivered in envelopes. One experimenter or research assistant 
was permanently stationed in each room, while two additional assistants collected and delivered 
the decision record forms between the rooms. Finally, another research assistant sat in the control 
room recording all the decisions by participant code in isolation from the participants themselves. 
Thus, no one could link a participant code with a name or a face could observe the decisions 
made. This decision communication procedure minimized potential confounding effects 
emanating from self-presentation and/or social desirability motivations.  
Participants made two decisions sequentially, interacting with different people. Half of the 
participants interacted first with a classmate and then with a nonclassmate counterpart; while for 
the other half this order was reversed (CN and NC order hereafter). In addition to this reversal, 
the following procedures were implemented to mitigate multiple-round effects. First, participants 
were not told the number of decisions they would be asked to make at the beginning of the 
experiment, nor were they informed in the second condition that it was the last condition in the 
experiment. Second, the outcomes for the first condition were not revealed to the trustors until 
the very end of the experiment, i.e., after they completed the second condition and the post-
experiment questionnaire. However, due to the game structure, a trustee always knew the result 
of an interaction as soon as s/he made a decision. 
At the end of the experiment participants were asked to complete a short post-experiment 
questionnaire for information on gender and age. After completing the questionnaire, participants   14 
 
were paid individually in the experimental control room to protect their anonymity. The research 
assistants who paid the students had not worked on any other aspect of the experiment and were 
unfamiliar with the structure of the game. Thus, they were unable to infer anything about the 
decisions made by the participants from the amounts of money earned. Only one of the two 
experimental rounds was randomly chosen for payment to ensure that money earned in one round 
did not affect behavior in the subsequent round and that each round was considered independent 
and equally important. Each session took approximately one hour and participants earned on 
average Ұ27.50 RMB. This was substantially higher than the average wage of Ұ10 RMB to Ұ15 
RMB an hour for jobs on campus and had purchasing power equivalent to about $18 US dollars. 
 
Hypothetical session procedure. The hypothetical questionnaire session followed the same 
procedures employed in the behavioral session as much as possible. Participants were required to 
complete two separate questionnaire surveys one by one. In each questionnaire, after following 
along as the experimenter read aloud the instructions for the behavioral trust game summarized 
above, participants were asked to respond to the following questions translated here from the 
Chinese: 
 
Trustors: Imagine you were playing this game as ‘Party A’. Please state how much you 
would send to a randomly-paired ‘Party B’, who is your fellow classmate (or a 
nonclassmate) from DUFE, and how much you would expect to receive back from him/her 
based on the amount you would send. 
Trustees: Imagine you were playing this game as ‘Party B’. Please state how much you 
would expect to receive from a randomly-paired ‘Party A’, who is your fellow classmate 
(or a nonclassmate) from DUFE, and how much you would return to him/her based on 
your expectation.  
 
At the end of the experiment participants were asked to complete the same post-  15 
 
experiment questionnaire as in the behavioral session. Since the hypothetical sessions 
involved purely hypothetical endowments, participants were paid a fixed participation fee 
of Ұ10 RMB for about 45 minutes of their time.  
 




Table 1 summarizes the results of both the behavioral and hypothetical format conditions. 
Specifically, we report the means and standard deviations for behavioral, hypothetical, and 
expected trust and reciprocity toward both a classmate and a nonclassmate. In addition, we report 
one-sample t-tests of the within-person difference in trust and reciprocity decisions with 
classmate and nonclassmate counterparts. The p-values associated with these t-tests indicate that 
trust (the amount of money sent to the trustee) were all significantly higher toward a classmate 
than toward a nonclassmate for behavioral, hypothetical, and expectation measures (p =0.02, 0.00, 
and 0.00 respectively), while there was no corresponding differences in reciprocity decisions (the 
amount of money sent back to the trustor). 
To formally test Hypotheses 1 to 3, we conducted a 2 (within-person repeated measure of 
social-distance level) × 2 (between-person measure of decision-order) mixed analysis of variance 
(mixed ANOVA) test for each dependent variable.
[1] Table 2 summarizes the results of this 
analysis.  
For trust decisions measured behaviorally, a significant main effect was found for level of 
social distance [F(1, 56) = 6.207, p = 0.016]. This implies that participants, averaged over the CN 
and NC orders, exhibited significantly higher trust toward a classmate than toward a 
nonclassmate. Order had no significant interaction with the main effect of social distance on trust. 
For the hypothetical measure, trust decisions showed a significant main effect of social distance   16 
 
on both hypothetical trust [F(1, 57) = 34.05, p = 0.00] and expected trust [F(1, 57) = 28.90, p = 
0.00]. The measure of expected trust also showed an interaction effect between social distance 
and order, indicating that social distance had a slightly stronger effect in the NC than in the CN 
order [F(1, 57) = 4.61, p = 0.04]. A corresponding dummy-variable regression analysis, not 
reported in detail to save space, confirmed that social distance was nonetheless significantly 
related to expected trust regardless of order (p = 0.03 for CN order, p = 0.00 for NC order). These 
results together provide strong support for Hypotheses 1a and 1b. 
In contrast to these findings about trust, tests of reciprocity measures did not show effects of 
social distance. For reciprocity decisions measured behaviorally, there were no main effects or 
interactions between order and level of social distance. We controlled for the level of trust 
received,
[2] and this factor did not interact with social distance to determine reciprocity either. For 
hypothetical measures, we conducted parallel analyses and found that neither reciprocity choices 
nor expectations showed effects of social distance, nor its interactions with order or with trust 
received. Indeed, there was no correlation between the reduction in trust received and the 
unchanging reciprocity ratio when moving from the classmate to the nonclassmate level. 
Moreover, there was no significant correlation between behavioral trust and actual reciprocity or 
hypothetical trust and expected reciprocity between persons at either the classmate or non-
classmate level either.  
As a robustness check of the reciprocity findings, we used the absolute amount sent back 
rather than the ratio of amount sent back over amount sent, while controlling for the amount sent, 
as an alternative measure of reciprocity. This enabled us to include those instances in which no 
money was sent by the trustors. The results remained qualitatively identical to those using the 
reciprocity ratio: Even when we drop the control for increased trust received at the classmate 
versus the nonclassmate level, social distance has no significant effect on the level of reciprocity. 
Overall, results from the behavioral and hypothetical conditions disconfirm Hypothesis 2 and are 
consistent with Hypothesis 3.   




Our second study was motivated by a puzzle in the findings of Study 1. While more trust was 
extended to classmates than to nonclassmates, nonclassmates were just as trustworthy as 
classmates as measured by their reciprocity behavior. Indeed, trustors did not even expect a 
significantly greater return on their trust investment from classmates than from nonclassmates. 
This raises the question of why trustors exhibit more trust in classmates than in nonclassmates 
when they neither expect nor receive better reciprocity treatment from the former than from the 
latter. Study 2 investigated our hypothesized answer to this question, which focuses on the 
distinction between affect- and cognition-based trust.
 [3]  Since there were no significant 
differences between the results of our behavioral and hypothetical treatments in Study 1, we 
employed only the hypothetical methodology in Study 2.  
 
Sample and procedures. Sixty undergraduate business-major students at SHUFE participated in 
the study. The participants were in the third year of their undergraduate study and 40 percent 
were male. The study consisted of two parts. Part one was completed a week before part two. In 
part one, participants completed two questionnaires in which they were asked to consider all the 
questionnaire items in relation to one of their classmates on one questionnaire and to someone 
from the same university but a different class on the other. Half of the participants received the 
questionnaires in one order; half received them in the other order. The questionnaires stated that 
‘you do not know specifically who this person is, but you do know that it is one of your 
classmates/ someone from the same university but not the same class’. Affect- and cognition-
based trust were each assessed using six items adopted form McAllister (1995). Sample items 
include: ‘We can both freely share our ideas, feelings, and hopes’; and ‘We would both feel a 
sense of loss if one of us was transferred and we could no longer work together’ for affect-based 
trust, and ‘I can rely on this person not to make my job more difficult by careless work’ and ‘This 
person approaches his/her job with professionalism and dedication’ for cognition-based trust. We   18 
 
also measured the shouren/shengren construct with six items adopted from Webber, Chen, Marsh, 
and Payne (1999). Specifically, we asked participants to rate their familiarity with the academic 
reputation, strengths, and weaknesses of a typical classmate and nonclassmate (from the same 
University). Sample items include ‘I know the academic reputation of this person well’ and ‘I am 
familiar with the way s/he works’. Lastly, we measured the interaction frequency as another 
measure of shouren/shengren guanxi (Webber et al., 1999). Sample items include ‘I initiate 
interaction with him/her frequently’ and ‘S/he initiates interaction with me frequently’. We used 
a seven-point Likert scale for all items with responses ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree). All items were in Chinese and had gone through a translation and back-
translation procedure (Brislin, 1980). In part two, we replicated the hypothetical trust game as 
carried out in Study 1. Participants were also paid a fixed participation fee of Ұ10 RMB.  
 
Manipulation checks. To ensure that participants did consider their relationship with their 
classmates to be shouren guanxi while those with a nonclassmate to be shengren guanxi, we 
examined participants’ responses to the shouren/shengren guanxi and interaction frequency 
scales. Results show that participants did perceive their relationship with a classmate to be 
significantly closer than that with a nonclassmate (mean = 4.72 vs. 3.19, respectively, F (1, 59) = 
41.23, p < 0.00). Similarly, the interaction frequency was also rated as significantly higher (mean 
= 4.88 vs. 3.59, respectively, F (1, 59) = 34.56, p < 0.00). These results confirm that our 




 We first verified that the results of Study 2 were consistent with those from Study 1. As Table 3 
shows, using a one-sample t-test, we observed that as in Study 1, differing social-distance levels 
produced significant within-person differences in both trust decisions and expectations (p =0.00 
and 0.00, respectively) but not in either reciprocity measure. We then conducted mixed ANOVA   19 
 
tests using the Study 2 data. The results are presented in Table 4. As shown in Model 1 for trust 
measures, there was a significant main effect of social distance. In particular, participants 
indicated that they would send significantly more money, our measure of trust, to a classmate 
than to a nonclassmate [F(1, 28) = 21.62, p = 0.00], and would expect others to treat them 
differently in this respect as well [F(1, 28) = 15.00, p = 0.00].  
In contrast, for reciprocity decisions and expectations, no significant main effect of social 
distance was found. Moreover, neither order nor difference in trust received interacted 
significantly with social distance. Thus Study 2 successfully replicated Study 1, providing further 
support for H1b and H3b. 
Next, we observed that affect-based trust was significantly greater for classmates than for 
nonclassmates (p=0.00); while no such effect was found for cognition-based trust. Thus, 
Hypothesis 4a was corroborated. We then tested the mediation Hypothesis 4b following the 
procedures outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986). First, we established the existence of a main 
effect of social distance on trust. Second, we observed that affect-based trust was significantly 
higher for classmates than for nonclassmates (p =0.00) and this variation predicted both trust 
decisions and expectations  (p =0.00 for both cases), establishing affect-based trust as a candidate 
for mediation. Third, when both social distance and affect-based trust were used to predict trust 
decisions and expectations, the effect of social distance diminished (p =0.02 and p =0.11 for 
decisions and expectations, respectively), while the effect of affect-based trust difference retained 
its level of significance (p =0.00 for both hypothetical and expected trust). Moreover, partial η
2 
fell from 0.44 to 0.19 for hypothetical trust and from 0.35 to 0.10 for expected trust when affect-
based trust was added to the analysis. These results demonstrate that the affect-based trust felt 
toward a counterpart mediates the effect of social distance on trust decisions and expectations in 
an economic exchange, corroborating Hypothesis 4b. 
INSERT TABLE 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE 
   20 
 
DISCUSSION  
Our two studies investigating the effects of real relationship categories that are salient in the life 
of Chinese students yielded a very clear pattern of findings.  We discuss the key findings below 
and compare them with the findings of prior research. 
First, participants exhibit more trust toward classmates than nonclassmates.  This shows up in 
behavioral, hypothetical, and expectation measures. This result contrasts with Buchan et al.’s 
(2006) perplexing result that Chinese participants exhibit more trust toward outgroup members. 
One key methodological difference was likely responsible for these contrasting results. Unlike 
the minimal-group paradigm for the manipulation of social-distance levels in Buchan et al. 
(2006), our manipulation varied counterparts in two naturally occurring relationship categories, 
classmate shouren and nonclassmate shengren. Cross-cultural research suggests that the minimal 
group paradigm provides a less compelling simulation of a relationship in less individualistic 
cultures where groups are slower to form (Mann, Radford, & Kanagawa, 1985). More 
importantly, in the Chinese context the shouren-shengren distinction is salient among natural 
groups in collective societies, it may be less pronounced for ad hoc groups that are temporarily 
constructed in a laboratory setting (Triandis, 1995). Thus, as Buchan et al. (2006) conjectured, it 
might be more difficult to form temporary ad hoc ingroups among Chinese participants due to 
China’s collectivist culture. The fact that our results concerning trust were consistent with 
Buchan and Croson’s (2004) survey data, which also employed naturally occurring relationship 
categories, lends further support to the notion that this is a critical factor in the examination of the 
impact of guanxi on trust in China.  
Second, in stark contrast to trust, reciprocity was not sensitive to the social-distance 
manipulation. This lack of treatment effect appeared with behavioral, hypothetical, and 
expectation measures. In other words, while nonclassmates were actually as reciprocating as 
classmates, and furthermore expected to be so, they nonetheless received less trust.
[4] This result 
is contrary to the results in Buchan and Croson (2004), who found a significant drop in 
reciprocity as social distance increased in their hypothetical questionnaire data. We conjecture   21 
 
that this apparent inconsistency is rooted in Buchan and Croson’s use of a different reciprocity 
measure in conjunction with their omission of trust received as a control variable.
[5] 
We hypothesized, and subsequently demonstrated empirically in Study 2, that the distinctive 
effect of social distance on trust (as opposed to reciprocity) was mediated by higher levels of 
affect-based trust felt toward the shouren classmates relative to the shengren nonclassmates. As 
discussed earlier, while cognition-based trust refers to trust arising from a rational appraisal of 
how trustworthy or reciprocating a counterpart will be, affect-based trust has more to do with the 
emotional and social bonds one has with another person. From this perspective, it is not 
surprising that trustors sent more money to classmates with whom such bonds are stronger than 
to nonclassmates with whom such bonds are weaker. 
Third, while the level of trust was influenced by the closeness of the affective bonds between 
trustor and trustee, the level of reciprocity was not. When making trust decisions, there is always 
some vulnerability because of the uncertainty about how the trustee will respond. In such a 
context, affective bonds can have an important impact that goes beyond purely cognitive 
instrumental concerns. However, reciprocity decisions are made in response to a known amount 
of trust that has already been tendered. In the context of such certainty, affective bonds appear to 
make little difference as social distance had no significant impact on reciprocity ratio levels. 
Lastly, our results show that decisions and expectations in behavioral games with real 
incentives were parallel to those in hypothetical survey scenarios. This is a comforting result. 
That both the social-distance effect on trust and the lack of such an effect on reciprocity were 
robust to different investigative approaches gives added support and confidence to the important 
relationship between social distance and trust in China.  
 
Contributions to Theory 
Our paper makes three important theoretical contributions. First, it enriches the current 
understanding of guanxi. Tsui and Farh (1997) provided an excellent theoretical discussion of the 
nuanced nature of the distinction between guanxi and relational demography. Since classmates   22 
 
and nonclassmates were anonymous and demographically identical in our study, treatment 
differences were due only to the differing types of guanxi attached to the classmate versus the 
nonclassmate relationship. While the relational demography theory would predict no difference 
in trust between anonymous classmates versus anonymous nonclassmates, the guanxi theory 
contends that there would be a difference. In particular, the guanxi theory suggests demographic 
factors that are confounded with shared experiences, producing affective trust, will be associated 
with more behavioural trust than would the same demographic factors in the absence of such 
shared experiences. Our empirical results provide strong support for guanxi theory. 
Second, our results support the idea that the magnitude of the affect-based component of trust 
depends on the type of guanxi between the interacting parties, while cognitive-based trust does 
not differ significantly between the shouren guanxi and shengren guanxi categories in the 
presence of a common social identity based on relational demography. Affective bonds neither 
led trustors to predict a higher level of reciprocity from trustees, nor led trustees to reciprocate 
more generously in response to trust received. However, trustors were nonetheless willing to send 
more money to a shouren classmate than to a shengren nonclassmate even though trustors’ 
cognition-based predictions of reciprocity were the same for each. This willingness appears to be 
based on affect rather than cognition. In essence, we brought together constructs from the 
literatures on trust in managerial relationships to the economic and game-theoretic literatures on 
trust and reciprocity issues. This is a noteworthy theoretical contribution. 
That said, affect-based trust only partially mediates the relationship between social distance 
and trust decisions made in the hypothetical condition.  One possible explanation for the portion 
of the social-distance effect that does not work through affect-based trust is that while point 
predictions of classmate versus nonclassmate reciprocity are no different statistically, the 
unobserved confidence intervals surrounding these predictions might differ. If risk-averse trustors 
are less certain about how much will be sent back by nonclassmate trustees, they might decide to 
send them less even though the expected value of nonclassmate reciprocity may not differ from 
that of classmates. Whether or not this is the case cannot be determined by the point estimates of   23 
 
reciprocity gathered in our study. However, it should be pointed out that the standard deviations 
of actual reciprocity behavior reported in Table 1 are no larger for nonclassmate reciprocity than 
for classmate reciprocity. Thus, there appears to be no obvious evidence for a confidence 
interpretation of the reciprocity patterns. This issue deserves further study. 
Third, in contrast to the observed differences in trust, the reciprocity ratio did not change with 
social distance. In other words, in contrast to trust itself, the response to trust is no different 
between shouren classmates than between shengren nonclassmates with a shared demographic 
identity. This implies that while guanxi significantly affects trust, it may not affect reciprocity. 
Our findings suggest that trust-related judgements and decisions are driven by affective concerns, 
which are greater felt toward shouren than shengren. In contrast, reciprocity-related judgements 
and decisions do not seem to be driven by such sentiments, as they are not greater for shouren 
than for shengren. This presents a challenge to accounts of guanxi as a unitary factor affecting all 
sorts of economic decisions.  Different aspects of guanxi, aside from affect-based trust, may be 
important as drivers of reciprocity decisions. 
 
Implications for Practice 
Guanxi is still of paramount importance for doing business in the midst of China’s transformation 
from a centrally planned to a socialist market economy. In China, trust embodies social, 
emotional, and relational elements (Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998), and flows more readily 
when it is rooted in closer guanxi. Our article reinforces the insights of earlier research using 
different methodologies regarding the importance of building family-like, affect-based guanxi 
relationships within organizations and between persons doing business with each other in China 
(e.g., Chua et al., 2009; Ng & Chua, 2006; Su & Littlefield, 2001). As also shown in the different 
context of a social-dilemma game by Ng and Chua (2006), the affect-based component of 
shouren guanxi is an effective means of building trust-based cooperation. In our studies, the 
average level of the reciprocity ratio was well above one for classmates and nonclassmates alike. 
Thus, more trust not only created social surplus, i.e., more overall benefit for the trustor-trustee   24 
 
pair, through the tripling mechanism, but was also rewarding on average for trustors individually. 
It is likely to be so outside the lab as well, especially when supported by affective ties and the 
principle of escalating reciprocity that is an ingrained part of the guanxi system (e.g. Su & 
Littlefield, 2001). Thus, we urge potential investors and foreign managers to actively build 
guanxi and develop initiatives to build trust and reciprocity relationships. Our findings provide 
evidence that cultivating personal relationships builds trust. 
While some researchers have warned about the negative aspects of the guanxi system in that it 
can contribute to nepotism and corruption in Chinese society (e.g., Chen, Chen, & Xin, 2004), 
our findings suggest that guanxi can have a positive effect as well by engendering a higher level 
of affect-based trust, which is likely to bring positive outcomes to both interacting parties. Su and 
Littlefield (2001) provide a very insightful discussion directed at Western managers about how to 
engage in the building of guanxi, while avoiding the traps posed by unethical practices. 
 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
The current research has a number of limitations. First, trust and reciprocity arise in many 
different contexts in the world outside the lab. We employed a laboratory trust game in our article. 
The relative simplicity of the game’s structure, while allowing us to isolate the concepts of 
interest, does not permit us to conclude that identical behavior would be observed in natural 
business environments with their many subtle complexities. Moreover, an economic exchange 
with another person is only one form of trust among many. We focused on the trust game because 
it is one of the simplest and most direct ways of observing and measuring actual trust and 
reciprocity behavior, and thus a good place to begin examining the effect of guanxi on 
judgements and behavior predicted by theory. Although the results of this study corroborate the 
theoretical predictions regarding guanxi on trust and illustrate a contrasting lack of effect on 
reciprocity in an economic context, their applicability to the many other forms of trust and 
reciprocity that exist in the workplace is uncertain. It is important to examine the effects of 
guanxi on other forms of trust and reciprocity in future research.   25 
 
Second, this research focuses on just two levels of social distance: classmate shouren and 
nonclassmate shengren with a common demographic identity. It is also important to examine 
how other relationships between people affect trust and reciprocity. Similarly, we employ a 
minimal guanxi paradigm, maintaining anonymity between participants to remove perceptions 
individual people may have of each other and social pressure. In future work, it would be 
interesting and informative to investigate how removing anonymity either before or after the trust 
and reciprocity exchanges and/or making individual trust and reciprocity decisions public might 
interact with social distance to affect behaviour. 
Third, following a mono-cultural indigenous approach, we presented an in-depth one-country 
study, rather than a cross-cultural comparative study. Mono-cultural indigenous research 
‘attempts to understand individual psychological functioning in the cultural context in which it 
developed’ (Berry, 1994: 120). Hence it emphasizes ‘the roles cultural traditions and social 
practices play in regulating, expressing, transforming and permuting the human psyche’ 
(Shweder, 1990:1) as well as the interactions between culture and the human mind (Shweder, 
1990). Indigenous inquiries such as ours aim to develop an evolving system of knowledge 
specific to that culture, which will ultimately produce a higher-order, balanced, global 
understanding of human cognition and behavior (Yang, 2000). Indeed, we speculate that the 
organizational structure that promotes particular closeness among classmates in China is itself a 
reflection of the central importance of guanxi in Chinese culture. Nonetheless, it would be 
interesting to examine other societies to see how social distance affects trust in differing cultural 
contexts. For example, do other countries influenced by Confucian Chinese culture like Japan 
and Korea show similar patterns to those observed in China? What role does quanxi play in 
overseas Chinese communities? How does social distance affect trust and reciprocity in other 
non-Western countries? These are all interesting areas for future research. 
Notwithstanding the limitations discussed above, the methodology employed in our paper 
created a controlled laboratory environment, enabling us to abstract from confounding factors to 
isolate the effects of social distance on trust and reciprocity in a culture of guanxi. It also   26 
 
employed a hypothetical questionnaire to probe beyond behavior to consider the attitudes and 
expectations underlying exchanges of trust and reciprocity between shouren and between 
shengren with a common demographic identity.  
 
Conclusion   
A society cannot advance without trust and reciprocity. Earlier literature has emphasized that 
trust is highly influenced by cultural heritage and social institutions. In the context of China, the 
consistent and complementary results obtained using two methodological approaches in this 
article suggest that guanxi can foster a higher level of affect-based trust. Closer and deeper 
guanxi relationships engender such trust, while not necessarily affecting reciprocity. This can 
promote the creation of social surplus. At the levels of reciprocity observed in our study, both 
trustors and trustees benefit from this surplus even though the level of reciprocity is not itself 
directly affected by social distance. This suggests a potential to extend the boundaries of trust in 
China, creating benefits for individuals and organizations both as trustors and trustees. While 
China has enjoyed tremendous economic and social achievement in the last three decades, further 
and sustainable long-term progress will depend on cultivating and fostering higher levels of trust 
and reciprocity within Chinese society and between Chinese and potential collaborators abroad. 
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[1] Initially, we controlled for possible two-way interactions between gender and social distance 
as well as gender and order, and a possible three-way interaction between gender, order and 
social distance as well. None of the independent variables involving gender was ever significant 
at conventional levels. Thus, gender was dropped from the analysis. 
 
[2] Earlier work has provided mixed evidence regarding whether the level of trust received can 
influence the level of the reciprocity ratio in sequential-exchange games. For example, using the 
same trust game, Pillutla, Malhotra, & Murnighan (2003) found that reciprocity ratios increased 
with the level of trust, while others reported that trustees do not respond to an increase in trust 
experienced by a higher reciprocity ratio (e.g. ,Bolton, Brandts, & Ockenfels, 1998; Charness & 
Rabin, 2002; Song, 2008, 2009). Given such contrasting empirical results reported in earlier 
papers, we felt it prudent to control for the level of trust received.  
 
[3] We thank Michael Morris, Senior Editor of Management and Organization Review, for 
suggesting this study. 
 
[4] A similar apparent disconnection between trustors and trustees is reported by Cox and Deck 
(2005) in a different kind of trust game in which first movers choose either to engage or exit 
while second movers choose either to cooperate or defect. Decreasing anonymity leads to a 
higher rate of cooperation by second movers, but has no effect on the rate at which first movers 
choose to engage. 
 
[5] Buchan and Croson (2004) defined reciprocity differently from the way it was defined in our 
paper. In particular, while we defined reciprocity as the ratio of the amount sent back by the 
trustee to the amount sent by the trustor, Buchan and Croson (2004) defined it as the ratio 
between the amount sent back and the total post-transfer wealth of the trustee. Thus, the 
denominator of the Buchan and Croson (2004) ratio was the sum of the trustee’s initial 
endowment plus the tripled amount received. Moreover, Buchan and Croson (2004) did not 
control for the level of trust received at each social-distance level. We did have such a control 
and found that the difference in trust received at each level of social distance had no significant 
impact on the corresponding difference in reciprocity using our definition; however this implies 
that it must have an impact on the reciprocity measure employed by Buchan and Croson (2004). 
Let E = Endowment of the Trustee, S = Amount Sent by the Trustor, and B = Amount Sent Back 
by the Trustee. Then our ratio = R1 = B/S and the Buchan and Croson ratio = R2 = B / [(E+3·S)]. 
Suppose R1 is a constant, i.e. it does not change as S changes. Then   
Thus, a constant R1 implies that R2 increases with the amount sent. Using our data together with 
Buchan and Croson’s (2004) reciprocity ratio, the difference in trust received does indeed have 
such an impact. However, as with our ratio, there is no significant relationship between social 
distance and reciprocity. If the difference in trust received is erroneously omitted from the 
analysis, an apparent significant relationship between social distance and reciprocity appears in 
our data. This reflects omitted variable bias. Since classmates tender more trust than 
nonclassmates, this implies a higher Buchan and Croson reciprocity ratio when there is no control 
for trust received. We conjecture that this may be the case with Buchan and Croson’s (2004) data 
as well. If so, it would explain why their findings regarding social distance and reciprocity differ 
from ours.   28 
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Table 1. Means and standard deviations by experimental treatment (Study 1) 
 
Variable  Classmateﾆ† Nonclassmateﾆ†  One-sample t-test of the 
within-person difference 
(p-value in parentheses) 
Panel A: Behavioral Format 














Panel B-1: Hypothetical Format, Trustors 































ﾆ† Standard deviations are in parentheses.   34 
 
Table 2. Mixed ANOVAs testing effects of social distance and order (Study 1) 
 
Variable and Source  df  F  p-value  Partial ŋ2 
Panel A: Trust Decision – Behavioral Format 
Social Distance  1  6.21  0.02  0.10 
Social Distance *Order  1  0.07  0.79  0.00 
Error  56       
Panel B: Reciprocity Decision – Behavioral Format 
Social Distance  1  0.17  0.69  0.00 
Social Distance * Trust Received   1  0.01  0.92  0.00 
Social Distance *Order  1  1.72  0.20  0.04 
Error  47       
Panel C: Trust Decision –Hypothetical Format  
Social Distance  1  34.05  0.00  0.37 
Social Distance * Order  1  0.52  0.47  0.01 
Error  57       
Panel D: Reciprocity Decision –Hypothetical Format 
Social Distance  1  0.05  0.82  0.00 
Social Distance * Trust Expected  1  1.44  0.24  0.03 
Social Distance *Order  1  2.70  0.11  0.05 
Error  56       
Panel E: Trust Expectation 
Social Distance  1  28.90  0.00  0.34 
Social Distance *Order  1  4.61  0.04  0.08 
Error  57       
Panel F: Reciprocity Expectation 
Social Distance  1  1.48  0.23  0.03 
Social Distance * Trust Received  1  2.24  0.14  0.04 
Social Distance *Order  1  2.32  0.13  0.04 
Error  52         35 
 
Table 3. Means and standard deviations by experimental treatment (Study 2) 
 
Variable  Classmateﾆ†  Nonclassmateﾆ†  One-sample t-test of the 
within-person difference 
(p-value in parentheses) 
Data from the Trustors 




































Data from the Trustees 




































Note: ﾆ† Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Table 4. Mixed ANOVAs testing effects of social distance and order (Study 2) 
 
Variable and Source  df  F  p-value  Partial ŋ
2 
Panel A: Trust Decision 
Model 1         
Social Distance  1  21.62  0.00  0.44 
Social Distance * Order  1  0.15  0.70  0.01 
Error  28       
Model 2         
Social Distance  1  5.73  0.02  0.19 
Social Distance * Affect-Based Trust  1  18.60  0.00  0.43 
Social Distance * Order  1  0.39  0.54  0.02 
Error  27       
Panel B: Trust Expectation 
Model 1         
Social Distance  1  15.00  0.00  0.35 
Social Distance * Order  1  0.06  0.81  0.00 
Error  28       
Model 2         
Social Distance  1  2.82  0.11  0.10 
Social Distance * Affect-Based Trust  1  35.47  0.00  0.57 
Social Distance * Order  1  0.99  0.33  0.04 
Error  27       
Panel C: Reciprocity Decision 
Social Distance    1  0.93  0.35  0.03 
Social Distance * Trust Expected   1  0.09  0.77  0.00 
Social Distance *Order  1  0.10  0.76  0.00 
Error  26       
Panel D: Reciprocity Expectation 
Social Distance   1  0.74  0.40  0.03 
Social Distance * Trust Received  1  0.20  0.66  0.01 
Social Distance *Order   1  1.33  0.26  0.05 
Error  24       
 
 
 
 
 
 